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WORKING WITHOUT CHEVRON: 
THE PTO AS PRIME MOVER 
JOHN M. GOLDEN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Through a proliferation of post-issuance administrative 
proceedings, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
become a major player in the fate of patents after their initial 
examination and grant. In combination with the PTO’s more 
traditional roles in initial examination and general guidance, new 
post-issuance proceedings enable the PTO to help steer the 
development of substantive patent law even without general provision 
of high-level Chevron deference for the agency’s interpretations of 
substantive aspects of the U.S. Patent Act. Contrary to some 
commentators’ suggestions, congressional authorization for new post-
issuance proceedings does not appear to have included an implicit 
delegation of interpretive authority generally warranting Chevron 
deference on such matters. But the PTO can still accomplish much 
with lower-level deference and the advantages that its common “first 
mover” position provides. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From a relatively modest Jacksonian agency with limited 
responsibilities after the initial examination and granting of patent 
applications,1 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
emerged as an adjudicatory forum that competes with courts in 
reviewing the validity of original patent grants.2 Through a 
proliferation of post-issuance proceedings, the constitution of a new 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to preside over such 
proceedings, and new statutory provisions on these proceedings and 
their interactions with district court proceedings,3 the agency has 
obtained an expanded capacity to have both the first and last word on 
important questions of patentability and patent validity.4 These 
capacities include the PTO’s controversial ability to effectively void 
outstanding district court judgments by canceling previously issued 
 
 1. John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, 
and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1134 (2000) (noting that, under 
the 1836 Patent Act, “the Patent Office was given no power to issue substantive regulations—a 
limitation that continues to have significant legal implications”).  
 2. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 610, 631 (2012) (“Supported by 
financial reforms, the America Invents Act drastically expands the USPTO’s set of tools for 
reviewing the validity of patents.”). 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 49–52 and 210–17.  
 4. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging 
Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 276 (2015). 
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patent claims.5 Nonetheless, Article III courts have so far retained 
their traditional roles as the primary fora for patent-infringement 
disputes and as the primary expositors of substantive patent law. In 
particular, courts have not yet recognized a general basis for 
according high-level Chevron deference to the PTO’s interpretations 
of substantive provisions of the U.S. Patent Act.6 The PTO’s status in 
this regard renders it a relatively weak administrative agency by 
modern standards, having less responsibility for determining the 
meaning of its organic statute than many other federal agencies.7 
Further, this status apparently persists despite recent legal 
developments. Contrary to recent arguments by some commentators, 
this Article contends that recent additions to the Patent Act are 
unlikely to change courts’ perception of the level of PTO interpretive 
authority. But through new post-issuance proceedings, the PTO might 
have a greater entitlement to lower-level Skidmore deference, a form 
of deference under which courts are to accord positive weight to an 
agency’s interpretation in accordance with factors such as the quality 
 
 5. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that cancellation of asserted patent claims in USPTO reexamination eliminated the 
patentee’s cause of action in an infringement suit that “remain[ed] pending” on appeal despite 
the fact that the district court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had already 
upheld the asserted claims against challenges of invalidity); id. at 1347 (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(contending that the Federal Circuit majority’s holding enables the USPTO “to override and 
void the final judgment of a federal Article III Court of Appeals” and thereby “violates the 
constitutional plan”); see also Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 733 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (contending that, where no court “could disturb 
[the patentee’s adjudicated] entitlement to damages for infringement,” “[u]nder no reasonable 
application of the law . . . could the PTO’s actions eradicate that judgment”); Shashank 
Upadhye & Adam Sussman, A Real Separation of Powers or Separation of Law: Can an Article I 
Administrative Agency Nullify an Article III Federal Court Judgment?, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2014) (noting the “tone of offense . . . in the Fresenius dissent” 
at “the concept that . . . when the PTO nullified the patent, the PTO said the court should do so 
too”).  
 6. See, e.g., Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting the Federal 
Circuit’s position “that the [PTO’s] Board [of Patent Appeals and Interferences] does not earn 
Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law”); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 
1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the PTO Commissioner’s “Final Determination” of a 
question of statutory interpretation was not eligible for Chevron deference “[b]ecause Congress 
has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power”).  
 7. John M. Golden, The USPTO’s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66 SMU 
L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power] (noting that, unlike 
many federal administrative agencies, the PTO lacks a recognized entitlement to “high-level 
[Chevron] deference for its interpretation of substantive aspects of the Patent Act”). 
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of the agency’s deliberations and reasoning.8 The PTO can and should 
exploit such deference and its common “first mover” advantage to 
help steer the development of patent law’s substance and process 
toward a more stable and pragmatically balanced future.9 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the PTO’s 
growth and the PTAB’s nature and early impacts. Part II highlights 
limitations on PTO authority, particularly the PTO’s apparently 
continuing absence of a general grant of Chevron-level interpretive 
authority on questions of substantive patent law. In this vein, Part II 
counters other commentators’ contentions that new statutory 
provisions for PTO proceedings in the 2011 Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act (AIA)10 mean that, when issued through new post-
issuance proceedings, PTAB decisions on the meaning of substantive 
provisions of the Patent Act have a general entitlement to Chevron 
deference. Part III points out that, even without a new claim to 
Chevron deference, the PTO can benefit from a stronger claim to 
Skidmore deference. The PTO can use Skidmore deference and its 
first-mover advantages to contribute substantially to the development 
of patent law. The Conclusion suggests that the PTO’s diligent use of 
such existing capacities might be more fruitful than efforts to expand 
the PTO’s interpretive authority. 
I.  NOT THE 1970S’ PTO 
The past four decades have featured dramatic institutional 
developments in U.S. patent law. The Article III judiciary has starred 
in a number of these, including, (1) the emergence of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the primary, day-to-day judicial 
expositor of patent law;11 (2) the U.S. Supreme Court’s temporary 
 
 8. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (describing factors that give an 
agency’s judgment “power to persuade”); see also Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, 
at 548–49 (discussing Skidmore deference). 
 9. Cf. Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 495 
(2012) (contending that “giving the USPTO more opportunities to engage in policymaking 
could enable the USPTO to produce economies of scale for the patent system and help create 
better tailored innovation policy”). 
 10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter AIA].  
 11. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008) (discussing the Federal 
Circuit’s performance during its first quarter century); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (examining the 
Federal Circuit’s performance during the first several years of its existence). 
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withdrawal from and subsequent return to being a regular active 
player in substantive patent law;12 and (3) the rise of jurisdictions, 
such as the Eastern District of Texas and District of Delaware, as 
favorite fora for patent disputes.13 The PTO’s growth into an agency 
with a multibillion-dollar annual budget,14 over ten thousand 
employees,15 and a raft of post-issuance proceedings16 has been 
similarly remarkable, however, and might presage a significant 
rebalancing of power between the PTO and Article III courts.17 
The PTAB appears likely to be at the center of any immediate 
rebalancing of power between the PTO and the courts. The PTAB’s 
central position in this regard stems, in part, from the sheer volume of 
work that it has assumed as successor to the PTO’s prior internal 
adjudicatory board, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(BPAI).18 But the PTAB’s prominence reflects two additional factors. 
 
 12. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the 
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283 (noting that, starting in “the mid-1990s,” the 
Supreme “Court began exercising its certiorari power more frequently in Federal Circuit patent 
cases”); John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for 
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 658 (2009) [hereinafter 
Golden, Prime Percolator] (observing that “the Supreme Court ha[d], in the past six years, 
asserted its dominion over patent law with frequency and force”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in 
the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 387 (“The Supreme Court has 
rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law.”). 
 13. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
631, 631 (2015) (“There are ninety-four federal district courts in the United States, but nearly 
half of the six thousand patent cases filed in 2013 were filed in just two of those courts: the 
District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Texas.”); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, 
Forum Selling, 32 (USC CLASS Research Paper No. 14-35; USC Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 14-44, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [https://perma.cc/TJ8T-
JW3Q] (observing that “Delaware is the only district that approaches east Texas in its share of 
patent litigation and the only other district whose share has increased significantly in recent 
years”); Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in United States District Courts: 1994 to 2014, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 39), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2570803 [http://perma.cc/
 YV4Z-VYBS] (commenting that “[t]he Eastern District of Texas has gone to great lengths to 
bend almost every procedural aspect of patent litigation in favor of plaintiffs” and that “[t]he 
District of Delaware has gone down the same path, but not quite as far”). 
 14. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 541 (reporting that, in fiscal year 2012, 
the USPTO “had about $2.3 billion in program costs”). 
 15. Id. (reporting that, in fiscal year 2012, “the USPTO employed over 11,000 people, 
including nearly 8,000 patent examiners”). 
 16. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 881 (2015) (chronicling 
the emergence of multiple mechanisms “for post-issuance review of U.S. patents” since 1980). 
 17. Tran, supra note 2, at 613 (contending that “a number of the USPTO’s new powers 
conflict irreconcilably with the Federal Circuit’s traditional view of USPTO authority”). 
 18. Michael Wagner, An Introduction to Administrative Patent Judges at the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board, 62 FED. LAW. 36, 36 (May 2015). 
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First, there is the eye-catching nature of its initial, relatively anti-
patentee, rounds of decisionmaking, which caught the attention of the 
patent community. Second, there is the possibility that at least an 
important subset of PTAB decisions on questions of law will receive 
significant deference from the courts. As discussed in Part III, such 
deference could result, for example, when the PTAB has interpreted 
PTO regulations. Further, even if Part II is correct in contending that 
courts are unlikely to recognize a general entitlement to Chevron 
deference for PTAB interpretations of substantive provisions of the 
Patent Act, significant deference toward these PTAB interpretations 
could result from the application of Skidmore deference in light of the 
relatively formal nature of inter partes PTAB proceedings,19 which are 
“inter partes” in the sense that they enable the continuous 
involvement of an opposing private party who actively contests a 
patentee’s contentions of patentability.20  
This Part proceeds by (1) providing a primer on the PTO and the 
PTAB, (2) discussing the PTAB’s growth and impressive caseload, 
and (3) discussing some of the early results of PTAB decisionmaking. 
A. Primer on the PTO and the PTAB 
The PTO is a division of the Department of Commerce21 that has 
two basic statutory responsibilities: (1) “the granting and issuing of 
patents and the registration of trademarks” and (2) ”disseminating to 
the public information with respect to patents and trademarks.”22 By 
statute, the PTO has independent “responsibility for decisions 
regarding [its] management and administration” but is “subject to the 
policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce.”23 The Patent Act 
vests the PTO’s “powers and duties . . . in an Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property” who bears the title of PTO 
Director and is “responsible for providing policy direction and 
 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82. 
 20. See Tran, supra note 2, at 631 (describing post-grant review as “provid[ing] third parties 
with an opportunity to challenge the validity of claims in a recently-issued patent on any ground 
relating to the statutory requirements of patentability”); id. at 633 (“After a post-grant review 
terminates or the window in which such a review could have been instituted passes, third parties 
may petition for inter partes review . . . .”). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office is 
established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce.”). 
 22. Id. § 2(a). 
 23. Id. § 1(a). 
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management supervision for the Office.”24 The President appoints the 
Director “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”25 Power 
to remove the Director is also vested in the President.26 
The PTAB is a body of administrative judges within the PTO 
that handles a variety of PTO appeal-and-review proceedings. By 
statute, the PTAB’s membership consists of the PTO’s Director and 
Deputy Director, the Commissioners for Patents and for Trademarks, 
and administrative patent judges.27 Under the Patent Act, the 
Secretary of Commerce appoints the Deputy Director “upon 
nomination by the Director,”28 appoints the Commissioners without a 
statutory requirement of Director nomination,29 and appoints the 
administrative patent judges “in consultation with the Director.”30 
The Director has the power to “fix the rate of basic pay for the 
administrative patent judges.”31 The Patent Act requires that PTAB 
judges sit to hear proceedings in panels of “at least 3 members . . . 
designated by the Director.”32 In a case decided specifically with 
respect to the BPAI but with reasoning that apparently extends to the 
PTAB, the Federal Circuit held that, although the Board is no mere 
alter ego of the Director and the head of the PTO “may not control 
the way any individual member of [a] panel votes,” the head of the 
PTO may designate a panel to rehear a case and, at least as far as the 
Patent Act (as understood by the Federal Circuit) is concerned, may 
“convene [a] panel which he knows or hopes will render the decision 
he desires.”33 Because the neutrality of a panel selected to produce a 
particular result might be questioned,34 constitutional constraints of 
 
 24. Id. § 3(a). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. § 3(a)(4) (“The Director may be removed from office by the President.”). 
 27. Id. § 6(a) (describing the constitution of the PTAB). 
 28. Id. § 3(b)(1). 
 29. Id. § 3(b)(2)(A). 
 30. Id. § 6(a). 
 31. Id. § 3(b)(6). 
 32. Id. § 6(c). 
 33. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated in irrelevant part 
by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), abrogated in irrelevant part by Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); see also John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 908 (2009) (observing that BPAI members “are 
not mere ‘alter ego[s] or agent[s]’ of the PTO Director” (quoting Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535)). 
 34. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & PAUL VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND PROCESS § 9.2.1, at 492 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that due process requirements are violated 
“where an administrator can be shown to have pre-judged the issues that will be litigated during 
a hearing”).  
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due process, which the Federal Circuit explicitly declined to address 
in its prior decision,35 might limit that directorial power over 
rehearings so that this power is in fact narrower than the statute 
facially allows.36 
Consistent with its name, “Patent Trial and Appeal Board,” the 
PTAB is charged with hearing and deciding a diverse array of 
matters: (1) appeals from “adverse decisions of examiners” in the 
original examination of patent applications;37 (2) appeals of 
reexaminations of issued patents;38 (3) disputes over whether a patent 
applicant derived the invention from another39 or was the first 
 
 35. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536 (acknowledging a due process challenge to “the 
Commissioner’s redesignation practices” raised by an amicus curiae but holding that, as a result 
of the relevant party’s waiver, due process questions were not eligible for the court’s review). 
 36. Cf. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009) (“We conclude that 
there is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a 
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing the judge on the case . . . .”); Duffy, supra note 33, at 908 (“Re-adjudication by the 
PTO Director would also, at least with respect to individual factual issues, raise difficult issues 
of due process.”). The Patent Act mandates that, “if on . . . examination it appears that the 
applicant [for a patent] is entitled to a patent under the law, the Director shall issue a patent 
therefor.” 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2012). The indicated entitlement to a patent is reinforced by a 
provision for “remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District court of 
the Eastern District of Virginia,” in which “[t]he court may adjudge that such applicant is 
entitled to receive a patent.” Id. § 145. In light of the prevailing entitlement test for the 
existence of a property interest protected by a constitutional requirement of due process, see 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-9, at 686 (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing the courts’ recognition of due process protection for “statutory entitlements” 
“founded neither on constitutional nor on common law claims of right but only on a state-
fostered (and hence justifiable) expectation”), it is unsurprising that the Federal Circuit and its 
patent-law predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have treated due 
process requirements as applying to pre-issuance examination of patents, see, e.g., In re Steed, 
802 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (sustaining PTO rejections of patent claims against a due 
process challenge not because there was no due process requirement, but instead because the 
PTO appeared to provide constitutionally adequate process); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 687 
(Fed. Cir. 1981) (finding a “clear infringement of Baxter’s procedural due process rights” in the 
PTO’s rejection of certain patent claims), as well as post-issuance proceedings to cancel patent 
claims, Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 598–99 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that “[i]t is 
beyond reasonable debate that patents are property” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause”). See generally Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that, as “[v]eteran’s disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated 
benefits,” “entitlement to [them] is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause”); 
Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Statutory language may so specifically 
mandate benefits awards upon demonstration of certain qualifications that an applicant must 
fairly be recognized to have a limited property interest entitling him, at least, to process 
sufficient to permit a demonstration of eligibility.”). 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)(1). 
 38. Id. § 6(b)(2) (providing for PTAB review of “appeals of reexaminations”). 
 39. Id. § 6(b)(3) (providing for PTAB conduct of “derivation proceedings”). 
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inventor;40 and (4) inter partes post-issuance challenges to the validity 
of issued patent claims, including inter partes reviews,41 post-grant 
reviews,42 and covered business method reviews.43 Like PTO 
proceedings in general,44 PTAB proceedings commonly focus on 
whether statutory requirements for patentability are met by specific 
patent claims,45 which are the numbered clauses in a patent 
application or issued patent that serve as the primary indicators of the 
scope of technologies subject, or intended to be subject, to rights of 
exclusion.46 Claims in a patent application that fail to meet statutory 
requirements for patentability are subject to rejection.47 Claims in an 
issued patent that fail to meet statutory requirements for patentability 
are subject to cancellation.48 
 
 40. See id. § 6(a) (“Any reference in any Federal law, Executive order, rule, regulation, or 
delegation of authority, or any document of or pertaining to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences is deemed to refer to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”); id. § 135(a) 
(providing, pre-AIA, for the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences to “determine 
questions of priority”).  
 41. Id. § 6(b)(4) (providing for PTAB conduct of “inter partes reviews”); id. § 311(b) (“A 
petitioner in an inter partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a 
patent only on a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of 
prior art consisting of patents or printed publications.”). 
 42. Id. § 6(b)(4) (providing for PTAB conduct of “post-grant reviews”); id. § 321(b) (“A 
petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a 
patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating 
to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”). 
 43. AIA § 18(a) (providing for “a transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of 
the validity of covered business method patents” using “the standards and procedures of[] a 
post-grant review”). 
 44. See Jay Erstling, Patent Law and the Duty of Candor: Rethinking the Limits of 
Disclosure, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 333 (2011) (“The job of the PTO and of a patent 
examiner within the office is to examine each claim in an application to determine whether the 
claim meets the requirements of patentability set forth in the Patent Act . . . .”). 
 45. Eleanor M. Yost & Stephen T. Schreiner, Patent Trial and Appeal Board Trials 
Overhaul Patent Strategies, in ASPATORE THOUGHT LEADERSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW 2015, at 77, 78 (2015) (describing PTAB proceedings as involving “rulings regarding 
institution of trials, discovery matters, and ultimately, the patentability of claims”). 
 46. See John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive 
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 
(2008) (“Claims—numbered clauses at the end of a patent—are meant to provide notice of what 
a patent covers . . . .”). 
 47. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 57 (4th ed. 2013) (“[T]he examiner may 
initially ‘allow’ (i.e., approve) certain of the applicant’s claims and reject others, or (relatively 
rarely) may allow all the claims, or (more typically) reject all the claims.”). 
 48. See id. at 421 (noting that a “Reexamination Certificate” issued at the end of a 
reexamination will “cancel any claim of the issued patent that is determined to be 
unpatentable”); id. at 432 (noting that a petitioner for inter partes review can ask the USPTO 
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The PTAB’s powers and responsibilities are a substantial step-up 
from those of its predecessor, the BPAI. Derivation proceedings, inter 
partes reviews, post-grant reviews, and covered business method 
reviews are all creatures of the 2011 America Invents Act.49 The 
AIA’s provisions for inter partes, post-grant, and covered business 
method review notably empower the PTAB to conduct more trial-
like proceedings than those previously conducted by the PTO.50 
Further, post-grant and covered business method reviews permit a 
broader range of potential validity challenges than were previously 
available in PTO post-issuance proceedings.51 Thus, the PTAB’s array 
of new proceedings naturally make the PTAB a forum for post-
issuance validity challenges that competes more generally with the 
district courts than the pre-AIA BPAI.52 
B. The PTAB’s Growth and High Caseload 
In addition to the scope of validity issues that the PTAB may 
hear, the number of cases already under PTAB review attest to its 
 
“to cancel as unpatentable one or more claims of a patent”); id. at 435 (observing that the aim of 
a petitioner for post-grant review is to “persuad[e] the USPTO to cancel [a patent’s] claims”).  
 49. See Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity of Administrative Challenges to 
Patents: Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558, 561 n.6 (2013) 
(“With the passage of the America Invents Act, inter partes reexamination was repealed and 
replaced by three new administrative procedures for challenging patents: post-grant review, 
inter partes review, and the so-called ‘transitional program for covered business method 
patents,’ which follows roughly the same procedures as post-grant review.”); Tran, supra note 2, 
at 629–37 (discussing post-issuance proceedings under the AIA). 
 50. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber & Elizabeth Iglesias, Inter Partes Review Is the New 
Normal: What Has Been Lost? What Has Been Gained?, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 539, 541 (2012) (“[T]he 
new IPR procedures, defined by both the AIA and the PTO’s rules, are more ‘trial-like’ than 
the PTO’s prior Reexam practice.”); Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 487, 493 (2012) (discussing PTO rulemaking authority relating to “its new and 
fortified trial-like proceedings, including derivation, post-grant review, and inter partes review 
proceedings”). 
 51. See John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical Survivors, 26 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 613–14 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, Patent Privateers] (observing that, 
in 2011, Congress provided for “a new form of post-grant review in which third parties can 
challenge patentability on broader grounds than reexamination had made available”). 
 52. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request 
to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under 
paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”), and 
AIA § 18(a) (providing for “review of the validity of covered business method patents” using 
“the standards and procedures of[] a post-grant review”), with 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (identifying as 
a defense to a patent-infringement suit brought in district court the “[i]nvalidity of the patent or 
any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II [of the Patent Act] as a condition for 
patentability”). 
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substantial role in the post-AIA power structure of U.S. patent law. 
From mid-2014 through the third quarter of 2015, filings for inter 
partes post-issuance proceedings before the PTAB arrived at a rate of 
about 150 per month.53 Hence, this single administrative body already 
has a case flow of petitions for inter partes review equaling nearly 
one-third of the flow of new patent cases into all the U.S. district 
courts.54 Moreover, such inter partes case flow is only a fraction of the 
PTAB’s overall caseload. The PTAB tends to resolve approximately 
ten thousand appeals each year in ex parte proceedings involving only 
the patent applicant or owner.55 The demand for resolution of such ex 
parte appeals is relentless: as of September 2015, the PTAB faced a 
backlog of over twenty thousand pending ex parte appeals.56 
Unsurprisingly, the PTO has hired PTAB judges at a rapid rate 
to try to meet the avalanche of incoming work. The BPAI had eighty-
one judges in 2010,57 the year before passage of the America Invents 
Act.58 By August 2015, the PTAB had 235 members, almost triple the 
 
 53. Brian J. Love, Inter Partes Review as a Shield for Technology Purchasers: A Response to 
Gaia Bernstein’s The Rise of the End-User in Patent Litigation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1075, 1079 
(2015) (noting that there was “a full-blown explosion of [inter partes review] filings in 2014”); 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-30%20PTAB.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/W5ZL-ESZZ] (showing graphs for numbers of petitions for inter partes review, 
covered business method review, and post-grant review filed in each month from February 2013 
through September 2015).  
 54. See Cases Filed by Year, LEX MACHINA (Mar. 28, 2015) (on file with the author) 
(listing figures indicating that an average of about 460 patent cases were filed per month in U.S. 
district courts from 2012 through 2014).  
 55. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2014 PATENT TRIAL & 
APPEAL BOARD RECEIPTS AND DISPOSITIONS BY TECHNOLOGY CENTERS: EX PARTE 
APPEALS (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/stats/receipts/fy2014-
sep-e.pdf [http://perma.cc/8JQ4-DEVQ]. 
 56. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, SEPT. 2015 PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
(PTAB) DATA, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patenttrialandappealboard/main.dashxml 
[https://perma.cc/7HSG-UHGE] (listing 20,212 “Ex Parte Appeals” and 49 “Ex Parte 
Reexamination” appeals as pending before the PTAB).  
 57. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
QUARTERLY MEETING: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE 29 (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/20150820_PPAC_PTAB_Update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8627-MBP8] [hereinafter PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015)] (providing a graph indicating 
numbers of Board members in 2010, 2015, and select other years). 
 58. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
L-9 (May 2014) (noting that the new provisions for the PTAB as a replacement for the BPAI 
became effective on September 16, 2012); see also Aashish Kapadia, Inter Partes Review: A New 
Paradigm in Patent Litigation, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 113, 114 (2015) (noting that, under 
the AIA, “the Patent Trial and Appeal[] Board (PTAB) succeeded the previous Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)”). 
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BPAI’s 2010 membership.59 The size of the PTAB’s membership has 
spurred evolution of its organizational hierarchy, which currently 
features not only a chief judge, but also a deputy chief judge, two vice 
chief judges, and lead administrative patent judges for each of twelve 
divisions overseen by one of the vice chief judges.60 
C. Early Impacts of PTAB Decisionmaking 
Of course, the volume and substantive scope of PTAB 
proceedings might matter little if the PTAB generated no notable 
results. Given patent law’s virtually constant need to adapt to new 
technologies and applicant tactics,61 however, the PTAB will have 
trouble avoiding the front lines of many major legal developments. 
Indeed, the PTAB has already made a splash through its initial 
decisions. The results of the PTAB’s first eighty written merits 
decisions in inter partes review were eye opening: Gregory Dolin 
reported that all patent claims at issue were canceled in fifty-two of 
the decisions and that more than 70 percent of claims at issue were 
stricken overall.62 Such early results caught the attention of members 
of the patent community. Former Chief Judge Rader of the Federal 
Circuit described the PTAB panels as “death squads killing property 
rights” at an annual meeting of the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association.63 
 
 59. PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015), supra note 57, at 34. 
 60. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD (2015), http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Organizational%20Structure%20of%20the%20Board%20May%
2012%202015.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7DD-BTUT] (describing “how the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board is structured and manages its workload”).  
 61. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1041, 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Golden, Patentable Subject Matter] (“The malleability of 
technology and of techniques of patent claim drafting mean that the policing of [subject-matter 
eligibility] bounds requires not only continuous vigilance, but also continual updating of 
guidelines for examiners and courts alike.”); John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent 
Law’s “Cost Disease”, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 458–59 (2013) [hereinafter Golden, Proliferating 
Patents] (contending that the longer-term tendency toward growth in rates of patenting “creates 
constant tension as public and private bureaucracies, as well as individuals, struggle to keep 
up”). 
 62. Dolin, supra note 16, at 926. 
 63. Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-death-
squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642 [https://perma.cc/4BB7-C3KV]; see 
also Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 13 (noting then–Chief Judge Rader’s statement and others’ 
concern that “the Board is out of control”). 
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The PTAB’s rates of claim cancellation have cooled with time, 
but the Board’s record in winnowing patent claims remains 
impressive. As of January 15, 2015, the PTAB found unpatentable 36 
percent of the claims at issue in 173 inter partes reviews and a further 
15 percent of claims at issue in those proceedings were as of that date, 
otherwise canceled or disclaimed.64 In short, PTAB proceedings still 
seemed to lead to approximately half of all claims at issue falling by 
the wayside. In combination with the comparatively low cost of 
challenging claims before the PTAB, as opposed to before a district 
court,65 this record helps explain the popularity of PTAB proceedings 
with many patent challengers. 
The PTAB has also attracted attention through another aspect of 
its early decisions—the PTAB’s common rejection of motions to 
amend patent claims in inter partes review.66 The PTAB reads PTO 
regulations as demanding that, in support of such an amendment, the 
patent owner bears the burden of “show[ing] patentable distinction 
over the prior art of record,”67 including “prior art from the patent’s 
original prosecution history.”68 For many patent owners, the PTAB’s 
stringent approach to claim amendments has effectively taken away a 
crucial traditional tool in the patent attorney’s kit—the ability to 
 
 64. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REVIEW PETITIONS 
TERMINATED TO DATE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
inter_partes_review_petitions_terminated_to_date%2001%2015%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2NYW-F8GK]. 
 65. Stephanie E. O’Byrne, IPRs and ANDA Litigation: All a Matter of Timing, 62 FED. 
LAW. 55, 55 (Jan./Feb. 2015) (noting that “[a]n IPR offers undeniable cost advantages as 
compared to traditional patent litigation,” perhaps in the nature of a reduction in relevant 
attorney fees by a factor of seven); see also AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF 
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 37–38 (reporting survey results indicating that median total 
costs for inter partes proceedings through appeal are $350,000, whereas district-court-based 
patent litigation involves median litigation costs of $2 million or more when at least $1 million is 
at issue). 
 66. Dolin, supra note 16, at 929 (noting that, in final decisions, the PTAB has rejected 
forty-six out of forty-eight associated motions to amend, with the only motion granted having 
been an unopposed motion by the U.S. Government); Tony Dutra, Fed. Cir. Oks PTAB Limits 
on Amending Challenged Patents, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.—DAILY ED., Dec. 7, 
2015 (“Patent stakeholders repeatedly point out that, after three years of handling post-grant 
challenges enabled by the America Invents Act, the board has only granted motions to amend 
in five cases.”). 
 67. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Idle 
Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. 2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 
2013)).  
 68. Prolitec, Inc. v. Scentair Techs., Inc., 807 F.3d 1353, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (upholding 
the PTAB’s ruling “that the patentee’s burden on a motion to amend includes the burden to 
show patentability over prior art from the patent’s original prosecution history”). 
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overcome arguments against the patentability of individual claims by 
amending those claims to make clearer or greater distinctions from 
prior art or to tie the claims more closely to the patent document’s 
supporting disclosure.69 The PTAB’s approach in this regard sharply 
distinguished new inter partes post-issuance proceedings, in which the 
PTAB acts as trial court, from more traditional ex parte examination 
and reexamination proceedings, in which narrowing claim 
amendments have been readily available.70 
Significantly, the Federal Circuit’s review of PTAB decisions has 
not undercut the PTAB’s apparently robust powers. For much of 
2015, the Federal Circuit “affirm[ed] without opinion almost half the 
judgments made by the [PTO],” which were “almost all from the 
[PTAB].”71 Moreover, by the end of 2015, the Federal Circuit had 
repeatedly upheld the PTAB’s stringent approach to claim 
amendments in inter partes review under a highly deferential standard 
of review that applies to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations.72 
In short, not only has the PTAB demonstrated itself to be a body that 
can shake the landscape of patent law, but it has also shown that it 
can make its rulings stick by winning affirmation by the Federal 
Circuit. 
II.  CONTINUING LIMITATIONS ON PTO AUTHORITY 
Despite the PTO’s increased capacities in relation to post-
issuance review, the agency still has substantial limits on its powers 
relative to those of Article III district courts. Section II.A discusses 
some traditional limitations on PTO authority that appear to persist, 
and Section II.B focuses on one particular limitation that this Article 
 
 69. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE 
NEWMAN & F. SCOTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 102 (3d ed. 
2004) (“Usually, a response [to claim rejections and objections] includes both claim 
amendments and arguments designed to distinguish the invention as claimed from any prior art 
cited by the examiner.”).  
 70. See Dolin, supra note 16, at 902 (“During the reexamination proceedings the patentee 
can amend his claims to narrow (but not broaden) their scope, much like he would be able to do 
during the initial examination.”). 
 71. Tony Dutra, Fed. Cir. Affirming Half of PTAB Decisions Without Opinion, 90 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 3621, 3621 (2015). 
 72. See Prolitec, 807 F.3d at 1363 (upholding as “reasonable” a PTAB position “that the 
patentee’s burden on a motion to amend includes the burden to show patentability over prior 
art from the patent’s original prosecution history”); Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1307 (concluding the 
PTAB “reasonably interpreted” relevant regulations “as requiring the patentee to show that its 
substitute claims [we]re patentable over the prior art of record”).  
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contends most likely continues: the PTO’s lack of Chevron deference 
from the courts for its interpretation of the Patent Act’s substantive 
provisions. 
A. Traditional Limitations on PTO Authority 
Most obviously, the PTO continues to lack jurisdiction over 
questions of infringement.73 Further, in part because of its use of a 
“broadest reasonable construction” approach to interpreting patent 
claims,74 the PTO has limited its potential influence on claim 
constructions in district court actions and actions before the 
International Trade Commission, in both of which forms of action a 
“best construction” approach prevails.75 Further, “courts view the 
PTO as lacking any general grant of so-called ‘substantive rulemaking 
authority’ and, thus, as generally not meriting high-level (Chevron) 
deference for its interpretations of substantive aspects of the Patent 
Act.”76 Chevron deference traces back to the Supreme Court’s 1984 
decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.77 When Chevron applies, a court is to “uphol[d] an 
agency’s statutory interpretations not merely when the court agrees 
with that interpretation, but also whenever the interpretation is 
reasonable and not ‘contrary to the statute.’”78 The doctrine does not 
apply to all agency interpretations of statutes, however, even when 
the statute in question is the agency’s organic statute. Under the 
 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement 
of his patent.”); Golden, Patentable Subject Matter, supra note 61, at 1053 (“[T]he USPTO has 
historically had no direct involvement with determinations of whether an accused infringer’s 
conduct in fact constitutes infringement . . . .”). 
 74. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (concluding 
that, as with other PTO proceedings, the “broadest reasonable construction” approach applies 
to PTO inter partes review proceedings). 
 75. See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC, 728 F.3d 1309, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(describing a prior decision as “determin[ing] the best construction for a single disputed claim 
term”); Broadcom Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 542 F.3d 894, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting a proposed construction as “contrary to the most reasonable interpretation of the 
claims”); Asyst Techs., Inc. v. Empak, Inc., 268 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (declaring the 
nature of “the best interpretation of the patent”). 
 76. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 542; see also Joseph Scott Miller, 
Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2011) (“It is 
settled that Congress has given the Patent Office the power to issue procedural rules for patent 
examination at the Office, not substantive rulemaking power of the sort federal agencies 
typically possess.”). 
 77. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 78. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 547. 
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Supreme Court’s later decision in United States v. Mead Corp.,79 
Chevron applies only when Congress is understood to have delegated 
relevant authority and when “the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of such authority.”80 
Consequently, the Federal Circuit’s pre-Mead holding that the PTO 
generally lacked the authority necessary to obtain Chevron deference 
for its interpretations of substantive provisions of the Patent Act81 can 
be understood in a post-Mead world as deciding that, in general, 
Congress failed to delegate to the PTO the interpretive authority 
required for Chevron deference for the PTO’s interpretations of such 
provisions. 
The AIA undoubtedly extended the PTO’s rulemaking 
authority—for example, by empowering the PTO to issue rules to 
establish and govern the various new post-issuance proceedings.82 
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recently acknowledged that, under 
the AIA, the PTO has a new grant of authority to issue regulations on 
the standards for instituting inter partes review and on the more 
general governance of inter partes review.83 The Federal Circuit has 
further acknowledged that high-level Chevron deference may apply 
to such regulations and has applied such deference as at least an 
alternative basis for upholding the PTO’s application of a broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard for claim construction in inter 
partes review.84 
On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has viewed such new 
rulemaking authority as only a limited addition to the PTO’s powers, 
not one calling into question the prior understanding that PTO 
rulemaking authority is limited, rather than general.85 Even in 
 
 79. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 80. Id. at 226–27. 
 81. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that “the rule of 
controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply” because of the PTO’s lack of 
“general substantive rulemaking power” and the relevant interpretation’s consequent lack of 
“force and effect of law” (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979))).  
 82. See Tran, supra note 2, at 662–73 (listing AIA provisions conferring or describing 
rulemaking authority). 
 83. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting 
statutory provisions on the PTO’s power to issue regulations relating to inter partes review). 
 84. Id. at 1279 (“The regulation here presents a reasonable interpretation of the statute.”). 
 85. See Merck & Co., 80 F.3d at 1549 (“Congress has not vested the [PTO] Commissioner 
with any general substantive rulemaking power.”); cf. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing 
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1998 
(2013) (observing that the AIA “declined to grant the PTO the robust substantive rule-making 
powers that had been proposed in earlier versions of the legislation”).  
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according Chevron deference with respect to the PTO’s approach to 
claim construction in inter partes review, the Federal Circuit 
emphasized that it had not made “any finding that Congress has 
newly granted the PTO power to interpret substantive statutory 
‘patentability’ standards,” a grant that, according to the Federal 
Circuit, would have effected “a radical change in the authority 
historically conferred on the PTO by Congress.”86 Likewise, in a post-
AIA decision issued in 2013, the Supreme Court appeared to reaffirm 
the view that the PTO has no general entitlement to great deference 
on questions of substantive patent law by declining to give such 
deference to “the [PTO’s] past practice of awarding gene patents.”87 
The PTO’s continued lack of general rulemaking authority thus 
appears to leave it substantially hampered in its ability to determine 
the course of patent law’s development and application. Unlike many 
other administrative agencies, it cannot effectively bind the courts to 
follow any reasonable interpretation of its organic statute.88 Instead, 
for a PTO interpretation to prevail, Article III courts must be 
convinced that the interpretation is not only reasonable but should, in 
fact, be understood to be correct. 
B. Apparently Continuing Limitation of PTO Interpretive Authority 
Multiple commentators have suggested that, despite the PTO’s 
lack of general rulemaking authority, the AIA’s new provisions for 
post-issuance proceedings make PTAB decisionmaking a potential 
vehicle for the PTO to obtain Chevron deference on questions of 
substantive patent law.89 This Section contends that, except to the 
 
 86. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279. 
 87. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118 (2013). 
 88. See Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 541–42 (“Like many other 
administrative agencies, the SEC can receive high-level Chevron deference when the courts 
review its interpretations of the statutes it administers.”). 
 89. See Karen A. Lorang, The Unintended Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents, 
17 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 31 (2013) (“I predict that the Federal Circuit will also be required to 
give Chevron deference to the Board’s other legal conclusions made during post-grant review, 
including statutory interpretations of section 101 regarding patent eligible subject matter.”); 
Arti K. Rai, Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through the Administrative Process, 51 HOUS. 
L. REV. 503, 540 (2013) (“[D]octrinal analysis would indicate that the Federal Circuit should 
give Chevron deference to any legal determinations made by the agency in [the PTO’s] new 
proceedings.”); Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations 
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (contending that use of relatively 
formal post-grant review to implement PTO guidelines on issues of substantive patent law 
would result in “the strong form of deference enunciated by the Court in [Chevron] and its 
progeny”); Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1965 (contending that recent statutory changes 
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extent statutory provisions relating to such proceedings provide 
pertinent rulemaking authority, these provisions are unlikely to 
provide new general grounds for Chevron deference.90 As noted 
above, in Mead, the Supreme Court “held that an agency is entitled to 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC only if Congress has 
delegated to that agency the authority to issue interpretations that 
carry the force of law, and the agency has used that authority in 
issuing a particular interpretation.”91 There is little evidence that 
Congress intended a broad, implicit delegation of such interpretive 
authority to the PTO when acting through the PTAB in post-issuance 
adjudication. 
This Section supports this contention as follows. Subsection 
II.B.1 discusses how basic statutory language and context, including 
legislative history, fails to support the notion that Congress delegated 
general interpretive authority on substantive issues to the PTO 
overall or to the PTAB more specifically. Subsection II.B.2 discusses 
statutory language and legislative history specifically directed to 
PTAB post-issuance proceedings. Subsections II.B.3 through II.B.5 
focus on how PTAB proceedings and their review differ from classic 
models for formal adjudication and otherwise suggest both a lack of 
delegation of relevant authority and a lack of exercise of such 
authority under Mead. Subsection II.B.6 suggests that PTAB 
decisions designated as precedential might provide the best general 
case for such decisions meriting Chevron when they interpret 
substantive provisions of the Patent Act. But Subsection II.B.6 also 
 
“anoin[t] the PTO as the chief expositor of substantive patent law standards”); cf. Stuart Minor 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from 
Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 327–28 (2007) (describing proposed post-grant review 
proceedings as involving “trial-type procedures” to which “Chevron deference would seem to 
apply”). 
 90. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 545–46 (questioning arguments “that 
Congress’s 2011 adoption of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) has effectively given 
the USPTO the power to develop presumptively binding interpretations of substantive patent 
law when the USPTO acts through certain forms of administrative adjudication”). 
 91. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005); see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 537 (2014) (describing the great majority of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices as having agreed that “Congress often, but not always, intends for an agency rather than 
the courts to shoulder primary responsibility for filling statutory gaps” and that “not every 
action by an agency or its representatives reflects the identification of and deliberate effort to 
fill a statutory gap in the Chevron sense”); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of 
Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 766 (2014) (describing Mead as holding “that Chevron is 
subject to a Step Zero inquiry . . . asking whether the agency has been delegated authority to act 
with the force of law” and whether the agency exercised that authority). 
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argues that, at least under current procedures and in light of statutory 
silence relating to precedential status, even such decisions appear to 
fall short under Mead. 
1. General AIA Language and Context Relating to PTO 
Interpretive Authority.  New provisions of the Patent Act added by 
the AIA do not provide explicit indication that the PTO is now meant 
to have general access to Chevron-level authority through decisions 
of the PTAB. Of course, such a delegation of interpretive authority 
need not be explicit.92 But in light of the history of this authority’s 
established denial, a related refusal of general rulemaking authority 
in the legislative history of the AIA, and a concomitant expansion of 
the Federal Circuit’s role as the primary, day-to-day expositor of 
substantive patent law, argument for inferring such a delegation 
threatens to be an instance of contending, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, that Congress has “hid[den] elephants in 
mouseholes.”93 
As the Federal Circuit recently noted, “any finding that Congress 
has newly granted the PTO power to interpret substantive statutory 
‘patentability’ standards . . . would represent a radical change in the 
authority historically [understood to be] conferred on the PTO by 
Congress.”94 Thus, the Supreme Court’s admonition—described by 
one commentator as a new canon of statutory interpretation95—about 
the implausibility of inferring the presence of elephants in 
mouseholes, appears to apply. To the extent one subscribes to a 
traditional principle that courts should continue to demand a high 
degree of clarity when Congress overturns pre-existing legal 
precedent or statutory law,96 this principle provides a further, related 
 
 92. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (“[I]t can still be apparent from 
the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress 
would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in 
the statute . . . .”). 
 93. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2000). 
 94. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 95. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower Courts React When 
the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 542 
(2015) (“The ‘no elephants in mouseholes’ canon now occupies a secure, if limited, place in the 
interpretive landscape.”). 
 96. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 58.3, at 115–17 (7th ed. 2008) (noting “a conservative policy of resistance to 
change in the traditional structure of law” but also reporting a “trend away from strict 
construction of statutes in derogation of established law”). 
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reason to believe that the AIA has not slipped the PTO a general, 
PTAB-based path to Chevron-level interpretive authority. 
Perhaps even more tellingly, the legislative history for the AIA 
suggests that Congress was unlikely to have been ignorant of how 
radical a step such a conferral of Chevron-level authority would be. 
That history “prominently featured the trouncing of a proposal to 
give the PTO general rulemaking authority,”97 a grant of authority 
that would presumably entail implicit delegation of such interpretive 
authority.98 The explicit rejection of such a proposed grant in the 
legislative history provides at least prima facie reason to suspect that 
Congress was not contemplating “radical change” in the PTO’s 
interpretive authority. 
Moreover, despite vociferous academic criticism of the Federal 
Circuit’s handling of patent law99 and prominent calls for the court to 
be divested of its largely exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals,100 
the AIA in fact expanded the Federal Circuit’s role as primary, day-
to-day expositor of substantive patent law by extending the Federal 
Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to encompass compulsory 
 
 97. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 545. 
 98. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (making the lack of a 
grant of “any general substantive rulemaking power” to the PTO the linchpin of a decision not 
to accord Chevron deference to PTO interpretation of a substantive statutory provision); cf. 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (specifically noting the significance of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to the likelihood of “Chevron authority”); Abbe R. Gluck & 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 999 (2013) 
(observing that the overwhelming majority of congressional staffers surveyed “told us that the 
authorization of notice-and-comment rulemaking (the signal identified by the court in Mead) is 
always or often relevant to whether drafters intend for an agency to have gap-filling authority”). 
 99. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: 
Precedent and Policy, 66 SMU L. REV. 633, 636 (2013) (“[T]he criticism of the Federal Circuit as 
formalistic has been withering.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1625 (2007) (“We propose that, in addition to the Federal 
Circuit, at least one extant circuit court should be allowed to hear district court appeals relating 
to patent law. In addition, both the Federal Circuit and [the D.C. Circuit] should have 
jurisdiction over appeals from the PTO . . . .”); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Response Essay, Rethinking 
Federal Circuit Jurisdiction—A Short Comment, 100 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 23, 27 (2012) (arguing 
for “[r]estoring appellate jurisdiction in patent infringement cases to the regular circuit courts of 
appeals”); Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address, Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s 
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 9–10 (2013) 
(advocating a regime in which parties in patent-infringement suits have “the option of seeking 
review either in the Federal Circuit or in the regional circuit with jurisdiction over the district 
court from which the appeal is taken”). 
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counterclaims.101 As the Federal Circuit could effectively lose this role 
as primary, day-to-day expositor if the PTO were to obtain a general 
path to Chevron-level interpretive authority through the PTAB, 
Congress’s determination to expand the Federal Circuit’s role as 
substantive expositor on another front provides further reason to 
suspect that Congress would have provided a strong signal if it 
intended to undercut this role by conferring relevant interpretive 
authority on the PTO. 
In short, generally speaking, the AIA’s provisions and broader 
context provide little reason to suspect that Congress snuck 
delegation of Chevron-level authority for the PTO through the back 
door of PTAB post-issuance proceedings. Subsections II.B.2 to II.B.4 
provide further reasons for believing that neither such a grant of 
authority nor its exercise is implied by the nature of the PTAB and 
the proceedings it conducts. 
2. Statutory Language and History Specific to PTAB Post-
Issuance Proceedings.  Relevant legislative history specific to PTAB 
proceedings appears scant.102 At least one commentator has argued, 
however, that Congress substantially signaled its intent to confer 
Chevron-level interpretive authority through PTAB proceedings by 
explicitly providing a broad range of grounds for post-grant review.103 
But the sorts of validity issues that may be raised in post-grant review 
or the PTAB’s other post-issuance proceedings are far from 
 
 101. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539–40 (2012) (noting that section 19 of the America Invents Act 
“extend[ed] the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction to compulsory patent and plant-variety-
protection counterclaims”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012) (giving the Federal Circuit 
exclusive jurisdiction over “an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United 
States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a 
compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety 
protection”). 
 102. Cf. Benjamin J. Christoff, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Additional Grounds for 
Post-Grant Review in the America Invents Act Raise Issues with Separation of Powers and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 111, 127 (2013) (lamenting the lack of 
much evidence “about Congress’ intent” in relation to a provision allowing the PTO to institute 
post-grant review to address a new legal question). 
 103. See Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1993 (contending that the AIA’s provision for 
institution of post-grant review to address a “novel or unsettled legal question that [is] 
important to other patents or patent applications,” 35 U.S.C. § 324(b), “provides strong support 
that Congress intended postgrant review to be accompanied with a policy-making or law-
making ability”); id. (“Allowing the PTO to decide all contours of patentability during the 
postgrant review also supports the notion that Congress intended the agency to play a larger 
policy-making function.”). 
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unprecedented parts of the PTO’s docket: the PTO already had 
power to address challenges to patent validity on more limited 
grounds in pre-AIA reexamination proceedings,104 and the PTO has 
generally had power to address any requirement for patentability in 
original examination.105 
Further, explicit statutory allowance for instituting post-grant 
review on the ground that a validity challenge “raises a novel or 
unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or patent 
applications”106 does not necessarily indicate congressional intent that 
the PTO has greater authority to resolve novel or unsettled legal 
questions essentially conclusively. Perhaps the only detailed 
legislative history on point—statements by Senator Jon Kyl107—
appears to point in the opposite direction. Senator Kyl described this 
ground for PTO review as enabling the agency “to reconsider an 
important legal question and to effectively certify it for Federal 
[C]ircuit resolution.”108 Hence, in Senator Kyl’s account, the utility of 
post-grant review was substantially predicated on its capacity for 
enabling relatively early Federal Circuit decision. Moreover, Senator 
Kyl appeared to contemplate that the Federal Circuit would assess 
whether the PTO’s position was correct, not merely whether it was 
reasonable. According to the Senator, situations that would call for 
judicial reversal of the agency’s course would be ones in which the 
PTO’s position “is wrong” or “incorrect”—not only, as would be 
expected with Chevron-level review, situations in which the PTO’s 
position is unreasonable.109 
Indeed, Senator Kyl’s remarks reinforce the sense that the 
Federal Circuit, not the PTO, is to remain the primary, day-to-day 
 
 104. See MUELLER, supra note 47, at 423 (describing potential grounds for reexamination). 
 105. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to 
cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under 
paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”), with 
id. § 131 (providing for examination of patent applications to determine whether an “applicant 
is entitled to a patent under the law”), and MUELLER, supra note 47, at 56 (“The examiner’s job 
is to determine whether the application and the invention claimed therein satisfy the various 
statutory requirements for the issuance of a patent.”). 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b). 
 107. See Christoff, supra note 102, at 127 (highlighting Senator Kyl’s statements “in 2008, 
when the provision was originally proposed”). 
 108. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl); cf. 157 
CONG. REC. S1368, S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (asserting the 
relevance of 2008 remarks on “what is now section 324(b)’s additional threshold for instituting a 
post-grant review”). 
 109. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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authority on the meaning of substantive provisions of the Patent Act. 
Senator Kyl’s remarks signal this by specifically describing post-grant 
review as a means for the PTO “to effectively certify” questions so 
that they might be “conclusively resolved by the Federal [C]ircuit.”110 
As Verity Winship has noted, “[d]efined broadly, certification is a 
procedure by which one entity is able to obtain from the determining 
entity a conclusive answer to a question of law.”111 Hence, Senator 
Kyl’s certification language casts the Federal Circuit in the role of the 
relevant “determining entity,” rather than that of a deferential 
reviewer of the opinion of a law’s primary interpretive authority. 
More generally, Senator Kyl’s statements provide a common 
sense explanation for the broad grounds for post-grant proceedings 
that does not require recognition of new interpretive authority for the 
PTO when acting through post-issuance proceedings. By providing a 
wide administrative avenue for private-party challenges that could 
sidestep traditional requirements for Article III standing,112 the broad 
grounds for post-grant review could facilitate judicial review of 
disputed, pro-patentee legal decisions by the PTO “before a large 
number of improper patents are granted and allowed to unjustifiably 
disrupt an industry.”113 In contrast to an adversarial proceeding such 
as post-grant review, pro-patentee legal decisions made by the PTO 
in ex parte processes of examination or reexamination are more likely 
to escape judicial review indefinitely for the simple reason that there 
is no party to the administrative proceeding positioned to make a 
direct appeal. The patent applicant would, generally speaking, have 
neither a legal basis nor an incentive to challenge the PTO’s ruling. 
Moreover, until threatened with a suit for infringement, others would 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law 
Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 184–85 (2010) (“Defined broadly, 
certification is a procedure by which one entity is able to obtain from the determining entity a 
conclusive answer to a question of law.”); see also Allan D. Vestal, The Certified Question of 
Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 629–30 (1951) (“Basically, certification of questions of law is a 
procedure by which an inferior court is able to obtain from a defining court a conclusive answer 
to a material question of law.”). 
 112. See Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015) (“[W]here Congress has accorded a procedural 
right to a litigant, such as the right to appeal an administrative decision, certain requirements of 
standing—namely immediacy and redressability, as well as prudential aspects that are not part 
of Article III—may be relaxed.”). 
 113. 154 CONG. REC. S9982, S9988 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
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likely lack Article III standing to bring a declaratory judgment action 
challenging the PTO’s decision.114 
3. AIA Proceedings’ Deviation from Standard Formal 
Adjudication.  The argument that Congress did not implicitly intend 
for PTAB proceedings to be a vehicle for a broad expansion of the 
PTO’s interpretive authority is supported by the AIA’s structural 
provisions for how Board decisions would be reviewed. Although 
Congress enacted language requiring the PTAB’s administrative 
patent judges to sit in panels of “at least 3,”115 Congress appears to 
have made no explicit provision for review of panel decisions by a 
person or relatively small-numbered body representing the overall 
opinion of the agency—for example, by the Director of the PTO, who 
is “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate” and in whom, by statute, “[t]he powers and duties of the 
[PTO are] vested.”116 Instead, the U.S. Patent Act explicitly confers 
on the Federal Circuit the job of reviewing Board judgments in inter 
partes review and post-grant review117—arguably reaffirming a 
congressional understanding that the Federal Circuit, rather than the 
agency, is truly the primary, day-to-day authority on the substantive 
meaning of U.S. patent law. 
Although PTAB proceedings appear to involve various aspects 
of formal adjudication as explicitly contemplated by the APA,118 the 
 
 114. See Golden, Patent Privateers, supra note 51, at 549 (describing still restrictive 
requirements for “standing to challenge patents in district court”); Golden, Patentable Subject 
Matter, supra note 61, at 1086–87 (noting possibilities for substantial delays in subject-matter 
eligibility questions being presented to courts). 
 115. ERIKA HARMON ARNER & JOSEPH EDWIN PALYS, THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO 
TRIALS BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 21 (E.H. Arner & J.E. Palys eds., 
2014) (“Both [post-grant review] and [inter partes review] proceedings will be conducted before 
a three-judge panel of administrative patent judges . . . .”); cf. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (“Each 
appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review shall be heard by at 
least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be designated by the 
Director.”). 
 116. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1). 
 117. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) (“A party to an inter partes review or a post-grant review who is 
dissatisfied with the final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 
318(a) or 328(a) (as the case may be) may appeal the Board’s decision only to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”); id. § 319 (providing for appeal to the Federal 
Circuit from a final Board decision in inter partes review); id. § 329 (providing for appeal to the 
Federal Circuit from a final Board decision in post-grant review).  
 118. Cf. Dell Inc. v. Acceleron, LLC, Nos. 2015-1513 & 2015-1514, 2016 WL 1019075, at *6 
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2016) (“For a formal adjudication like the inter partes review considered 
here, the APA imposes particular requirements on the PTO.”). 
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Patent Act’s provisions for Federal Circuit review of PTAB decisions 
without intervening whole-agency review contrast substantially with a 
specific provision in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for 
whole-agency review in formal adjudication. If “the agency”—for 
example, the full body of commissioners within an agency such as the 
International Trade Commission—does “not preside at the reception 
of the evidence” in formal adjudication, the APA appears generally 
to contemplate that there will be a later opportunity for review by 
“the agency” of the “initial decision” made by the individual or 
individuals who do preside over evidentiary hearings.119 Thus, for 
example, in formal adjudication before the International Trade 
Commission, an administrative law judge (ALJ) typically presides 
over evidentiary hearings.120 The ALJ issues a decision on the merits 
that constitutes the agency’s “initial determination.”121 A party may 
appeal this determination to the Commission—that is, the ITC 
Commissioners sitting as an adjudicatory body.122 An adverse “final 
determination” by the Commission may be appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.123 
The PTAB’s use of administrative patent judges (APJs), rather 
than ALJs, itself provides a difference from formal adjudication as 
explicitly contemplated by the APA.124 For purposes of assessing 
whether Congress delegated Chevron-level interpretive authority, the 
level of formality of PTAB proceedings is significant because, under 
Mead, “[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates 
administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the 
fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of 
 
 119. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all 
the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on 
notice or by rule.”). 
 120. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2011) 
(discussing how the ITC refers cases to ALJs who preside over “formal evidentiary hearing[s]”).  
 121. Id. (“The ALJ then issues an Initial Determination (‘ID’) on whether section 337 has 
been violated and recommends a remedy.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 122. Id. at 1556 (“Once the [ALJ’s initial determination] issues, a party may request review 
by the ITC’s six-member Commission; the Commission can also choose to review the decision 
on its own initiative.”). 
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (providing the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over 
appeals); see also Kumar, supra note 120, at 1549 (“The Federal Circuit . . . hears appeals of 
patent decisions from . . . the U.S. International Trade Commission (‘ITC’).”). 
 124. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, § 6.4.3a, at 322 (“All formal adjudications must be 
presided over by (1) the agency; (2) one or more members of the body which comprises the 
agency; or[] (3) one or more Administrative Law Judges (ALJ).”). 
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such force.”125 PTAB trials fall into a large class of administrative 
proceedings—apparently common in the U.S. administrative state—
that might be considered “similar to [classic] formal adjudication” but 
are not technically “formal” in the standard APA sense because they 
feature administrative judges that are not ALJs, the type of 
adjudicator that the APA’s provisions on formal adjudication 
specifically authorize to preside over “the taking of evidence” in lieu 
of “the agency” or “one or more members of the body which 
comprises the agency.”126 Generally speaking, non-ALJ administrative 
judges are less insulated from an administrative agency’s more 
characteristic political appointees: they are subject to performance 
review by the agency, rather than the U.S. Government’s separate 
Office of Personnel Management, which may support agency action 
against an ALJ only when “good cause exists for doing so.”127 
Consistent with this relative lack of insulation, non-ALJ agency 
adjudicators such as the PTAB’s APJs generally “lack the statutory 
protection from removal, professional discipline, and performance 
reviews that ALJs have under the APA”;128 are generally not subject 
to the APA’s prohibition of ex parte communications “with agency 
officials during and about their hearings”;129 are more likely to invite 
due process challenges to the fairness and impartiality of their 
proceedings;130 and are less likely to issue opinions deemed worthy of 
Chevron deference.131 
Nonetheless, even if one assumes the PTAB’s APJs are 
acceptable substitutes for ALJs for purposes of “foster[ing] fairness 
and deliberation,” there would remain the concern that procedures 
relating to PTAB trials deviate from APA-contemplated formal 
adjudication in another significant way.132 As already noted, Congress 
explicitly provides for review of PTAB decisions by the Federal 
 
 125. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
 126. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b). 
 127. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, § 6.4.3a, at 322–23. 
 128. Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2658138 [https://perma.cc/GU6U-5C53].  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (“The most important benefit that agencies receive from using ALJs is improved 
appearances of impartiality.”). 
 131. Id. (“[U]sing [non-ALJ administrative judges], instead of ALJs and formal 
adjudication, decreases the likelihood under current doctrine that agencies will receive 
deference from courts (under administrative law’s well-known Chevron doctrine) . . . .”). 
 132. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
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Circuit133 and, in contrast to the standard APA model for formal 
adjudication, does not explicitly provide for review of decisions of 
PTAB panels by the agency as a whole. Instead of conferring on the 
PTO’s Director an independent, adjudicatory power to review PTAB 
decisions, the Patent Act confers on the Director a “right to intervene 
in an appeal from a decision entered by the [PTAB] in a derivation 
proceeding under section 135 or in an inter partes or post-grant review 
under chapter 31 or 32.”134 By failing to provide explicitly for appeal 
to the Director and instead providing for direct appeal to the Federal 
Circuit, Congress arguably placed the Federal Circuit in the 
authoritative position analogous to that of “the agency” under the 
APA’s standard provisions for formal adjudication.135 As discussed 
further in subsection II.B.4, typical PTAB panels consisting of three 
out of over two hundred APJs distributed among multiple, 
geographically dispersed offices136 seem a poor stand-in for “the 
agency” in the terms conceived by the APA, particularly given the 
APA’s explicit distinction between initial decisions by hearing officers 
and final decisions by “the agency.”137 
4. Mead and the Distinction Between PTAB Interpretation and 
Authoritative PTO Interpretation.  Subsection II.B.3 has highlighted 
how the nature and place of relevant PTAB proceedings within the 
patent regime make statutory provisions on PTAB proceedings a 
shaky basis for inferring that Congress intended such proceedings to 
provide an avenue for dramatic expansion of the PTO’s interpretive 
authority. Suppose, however, that the PTO is conceded to have 
Chevron-level authority over a relevant question of statutory 
interpretation. Under Mead, there would remain the question 
whether the PTO exercised that authority through PTAB 
 
 133. See supra note 117. 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).  
 135. Cf. Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 229, 278 (2013) (“[I]n 
creating a specialized court with a mandate of uniformity, Congress inadvertently created an 
agency-like entity in the judiciary.”). 
 136. See PTAB UPDATE (Aug. 2015), supra note 57, at 35 (showing 183 judges, including 
“teleworking” judges, as associated with the PTO’s office in Alexandria, Virginia; 20 as 
associated with the PTO’s office in Silicon Valley; 12 as associated with the PTO’s office in 
Dallas, Texas; and 10 as associated with each of the PTO’s offices in Denver, Colorado, and 
Detroit, Michigan). 
 137. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (calling for “an initial decision” by the presiding hearing 
officer “[w]hen the agency did not preside at the reception of the evidence”), with id. (providing 
for appeal of “an initial decision” to “the agency”). 
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proceedings.138 Mead itself provides reason to believe that PTAB 
panels are not proper vehicles for the exercise of such authority. 
In Mead, the Supreme Court found that a Customs Service 
classification ruling did not qualify as an exercise of the agency’s 
conceded interpretive authority139 even though such a ruling might 
have “precedential value” for “later transactions.”140 In support of this 
conclusion, the Court pointed to facts that (1) Congress had provided 
“for independent review of Customs classifications by the [Court of 
International Trade];” (2) “Customs does not generally engage in 
notice-and-comment practice when issuing them, and their treatment 
by the agency makes it clear that a letter’s binding character as a 
ruling stops short of third parties;” and perhaps most decisively, 
(3) “46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of [such 
rulings] each year.”141 To the Court, these facts were telling even 
though (a) Customs regulations provided that “[a] ruling letter 
represents the official position of the Customs Service with respect to 
the particular transaction or issue described therein;” (b) the 
particular ruling letter at issue came from the Customs Headquarters 
Office,142 rather than one of “the 46 port-of-entry Customs offices;”143 
and (c) “the Solicitor General of the United States ha[d] filed a brief, 
cosigned by the General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, 
that represents the position set forth in the ruling letter to be the 
official position of the Customs Service.”144 In the Court’s view, “[a]ny 
suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are being 
churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered 
offices is simply self-refuting.”145 
Even if the PTO as a whole had relevant interpretive authority, 
PTO decisions in the form of a final disposition by a PTAB panel 
would seem, generally speaking, to have no greater claim to Chevron 
deference than the Headquarters ruling at issue in Mead. As in Mead, 
 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 91.  
 139. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) (“[I]t is true that the general 
rulemaking power conferred on Customs authorizes some regulation with the force of law . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 232–33. 
 142. Id. at 222, 233–34 (observing that “the relevant statutes” provided “no indication that a 
more potent delegation might have been understood as going to Headquarters even when 
Headquarters provides developed reasoning, as it did in this instance”). 
 143. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted). 
 144. Id. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 233 (majority opinion). 
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there are substantial reasons for concern about the ability, or perhaps 
even intent, of agency heads to ensure that all individual decisions 
track the official agency view. Although the total number of PTAB 
rulings on the merits in inter partes, covered business method review, 
and post-grant review proceedings is not quite at the level of the 
classification rulings in Mead, dealing with such proceedings and 
petitions for such proceedings has already become a high-volume 
business, and this high-volume business is only a portion of the 
higher-volume business of PTAB review of appeals from decisions by 
PTO examiners that agency heads also have under their supervision. 
In addition to deciding about ten thousand appeals from original 
examinations or reexaminations each year,146 the Board has already 
issued final dispositions in inter partes review and covered-business-
method review at a rate of at least a couple hundred per year.147 
Moreover, the average annual number of such dispositions is 
expected to grow substantially: in the first three quarters of 2015, the 
Board received 1,897 petitions for inter partes, covered business 
method, or post-grant review and decided to institute over one 
thousand such proceedings.148 
Other points reinforce the sense that PTAB decisions in inter 
partes, covered business method, and post-grant review are unlikely 
to be viewed as warranting Chevron deference. Recent developments 
have given PTAB panels a geographic dispersion that might be 
compared to that of the Customs offices in Mead. Although 
administrative judges have historically been based mostly in the 
PTO’s central office in Virginia, they often appear there only 
virtually149 and now have bases in five offices dispersed across the 
 
 146. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, RECEIPTS AND DISPOSITIONS BY TECH. CTRS.: 
EX PARTE APPEALS (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/stats/
receipts/fy2014-sep-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7U3-RNMQ] (recording that the PTAB disposed 
of 9,880 ex parte appeals in fiscal year 2014).  
 147. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, AIA PROGRESS: STATISTICS (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_04-02-2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W2YW-TNMW].  
 148. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 5, 7 (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-09-
30%20PTAB.pdf [https://perma.cc/87M6-QNMT], (reporting the launch of 665 new inter partes 
reviews, 80 covered business method reviews, and 2 post-grant reviews in as-yet-incomplete 
fiscal year 2015). 
 149. See MICHAEL ASTORINO, MATT CLEMENTS, BART A. GERSTENBLITH & MEREDITH 
PETRAVICK, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
PATENT JUDGE 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/a_day_in_the_life_of_an_
apj.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPC7-SWUT] (noting, in remarks of Administrative Patent Judge 
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United States.150 Moreover, the PTAB lacks independent authority to 
give its decisions precedential effect even within the PTO, and few 
decisions by the PTAB or the BPAI have been given such effect. 
According to a PTAB rule of standard operating procedure, PTAB 
opinions are only flagged as precedential if (1) “a majority of the 
Board’s voting members agree that the opinion should be made 
precedential;”151 and (2) the PTO “Director concurs.”152 Whereas the 
PTAB and the BPAI have commonly issued thousands of decisions 
each year, the PTO currently lists only twenty-six precedential 
opinions of either Board that are currently in force, with the earliest 
of these opinions having been issued in late-1994.153 Nonprecedential 
PTAB opinions seem particularly unlikely to trigger Chevron 
deference from Article III courts, whose judges might wonder why 
they should consider themselves largely bound by a PTAB ruling that 
neither the PTAB nor the agency more generally considers to be 
binding. Subsection II.B.6 addresses in detail the special case of 
precedential opinions. 
5. Comparison to Mead’s Examples of Chevron-Warranting 
Adjudication.  Arguments for the general provision of Chevron 
deference to PTAB rulings on the interpretation of substantive 
 
Clements, that “the USPTO’s excellent telework options” and general allowance for judges to 
“appear by videoconference in a Hearing Room in Alexandria[, Virginia]”).  
 150. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
QUARTERLY MEETING: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE 33 (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/advisory/ppac/20140814_PPAC_PTABUpdate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2J88-BHTU] (showing office demographics); Texas Regional Office, U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/uspto-locations/dallas-texas 
[https://perma.cc/4A3B-DPVK] (“The goal is to have 100 examiners and 20 administrative 
patent judges, as well as several support staff, on site in Dallas by the end of the first year of 
operation.”).  
 151. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REV. 
9): PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL, 
INFORMATIVE, REPRESENTATIVE, AND ROUTINE 3–4 (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/sop2-revision-9-dated-9-22-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/66TR-7M
HQ] [hereinafter USPTO SOP 2] (indicating that “informative,” “representative,” and 
“routine” opinions are “not binding authority” except as “law of the case”). 
 152. Id. (“No opinion may be precedential without concurrency by the Director.”). 
 153. Precedential Opinions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 6, 2014), http://
www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/decisions [https://
perma.cc/DU6V-HBD9]; see also USPTO SOP 2, supra note 151, at 3 (“An opinion is not 
precedential simply because it has been published in a commercial reporter, involves an 
expanded panel, or includes an ex officio member on the panel.”); see generally id. at 2 
(indicating that “informative,” “representative,” and “routine” opinions are “not binding 
authority” except as “law of the case”). 
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provisions of the Patent Act do not appear greatly helped by 
comparison to the eight cases that a footnote in Mead specifically 
cites as examples of “adjudication cases” in which Chevron deference 
was warranted.154 Seven of these eight cases involved review of 
decisions made by a body looking like “the agency” in the APA’s 
terms—that is, a body consisting of a small number of presidentially 
appointed heads of an independent agency: the three heads of the 
Federal Labor Relations Authority,155 the five heads of the National 
Labor Relations Board,156 and the five heads of the now defunct 
Interstate Commerce Commission.157 Thus, from the start, citation of 
these seven cases provides little support for extending Chevron 
deference to the decisions of panels of a large-numbered body of 
lower-level officials like the APJs of the PTAB. 
For purposes of comparison to the PTAB, Mead’s eighth 
example is more intriguing. The case in question involved an 
administrative adjudication by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).158 Like PTAB members, BIA members are members of a 
multi-person adjudicatory body appointed not by the President but, 
instead, by the head of the relevant government department—in the 
 
 154. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 n.12 (2001) (listing eight “adjudication 
cases” in which Chevron deference applied). 
 155. See Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1309 v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 90–91 
(1999) (reviewing a circuit court’s decision to “set aside” an order of the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority); Fort Stewart Schs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 644 
(1990) (reviewing circuit decision that “upheld the Authority’s decision”); Dep’t of Treasury v. 
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 924 (1990) (“review[ing a] determination of the 
Federal Labor Relations Authority”). 
 156. See Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 396 (1996) (reviewing a circuit decision 
to enforce an order from the National Labor Relations Board); ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 
510 U.S. 317, 320–21 (1994) (reviewing a circuit decision to enforce an order from the National 
Labor Relations Board that had followed a hearing before an administrative law judge). 
 157. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 414 (1992) 
(reviewing circuit decision on final order from Interstate Commerce Commission); Norfolk & 
W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991) (responding to separate 
orders from the Interstate Commerce Commission); see generally Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. 
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1260–62, 1273–75 (2000) (providing information on the Federal Labor 
Relations Authority and National Labor Relations Board as part of a descriptive list of 
independent agencies); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 (2013) (noting that the Interstate 
Commerce Commission had “[f]ive commissioners, appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate”). 
 158. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (explaining that the Attorney 
General’s delegation of authority to the BIA provides a basis for Chevron deference to the 
BIA’s interpretations of the INA). 
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BIA’s case, the Attorney General;159 in the PTAB’s case, the 
Secretary of Commerce.160  
Nonetheless, the BIA differs from the PTAB in a number of 
ways that appear relevant under Mead. First, the BIA apparently has 
generally been, and remains, a significantly more exclusive and elite 
body than the PTAB. As opposed to the hundreds of members of the 
PTAB, permanent membership of the BIA has, since at least the 
early 1980s, been capped at a number ranging from five to twenty-
three,161 with the current cap standing at seventeen.162 The BIA’s 
permanent membership may be supplemented by additional 
temporary members,163 but the current number of such temporary 
members stands at the relatively small number of four.164 
A second way that the BIA differs from the PTAB is that the 
BIA can generally claim Chevron-level authority as a derivative of 
the Attorney General’s separately recognized Chevron-level 
authority. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Attorney 
General “clear[ly]” enjoys a general grant of Chevron-level 
authority,165 and the Court has accorded the BIA derivative Chevron-
 
 159. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2015) (“The Board members shall be attorneys appointed by 
the Attorney General . . . .”). 
 160. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (specifying that APJs “are appointed by the Secretary, in 
consultation with the Director”). 
 161. DAVID A. MARTIN, THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & 
MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 281 (6th 
ed. 2008) (discussing variation in the number of permanent BIA members); AM. BAR ASS’N, 
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3–5 (2010) (“Since [1983], the number of BIA 
members has varied from as few as five to as many as 23.”). 
 162. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (“The Board shall consist of 17 members.”). 
 163. The Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has the power to 
appoint temporary BIA members for up to six-month terms. Id. § 1003.1(a)(3). Temporary BIA 
members have the same adjudicatory authority as permanent members, “except that temporary 
Board members [lack] the authority to vote on any matter decided by the Board en banc.” Id. 
 164. In December 2015, the Department of Justice’s website indicated that, at that time, the 
BIA had fourteen permanent members and four temporary members. Board of Immigration 
Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-
immigration-appeals-bios#Temporary_Board_Members [https://perma.cc/FQ7D-RAJJ]. 
 165. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999) (noting statutory language saying 
that “the ‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law 
shall be controlling[,]’” and adding “that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially 
appropriate in the immigration context” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994)); see also 8 
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (“[D]etermination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all 
questions of [immigration] law shall be controlling.”); 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY 
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.03[1] (2008) 
(noting that “the Attorney General’s determination on all questions of [immigration] law is 
controlling”).  
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level authority in accordance with explicit regulatory language 
providing that, in deciding cases, BIA members “exercise the 
‘discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by 
law.’”166 Consistent with this delegation of authority, BIA members 
can vote to accord precedential status to decisions “by a three-
member panel or by the Board en banc” without requiring further 
action by the Attorney General.167 In contrast, the PTO and PTO 
Director currently lack a general grant of PTAB-independent 
Chevron-level authority in interpreting substantive provisions of the 
Patent Act.168 Moreover, neither the Patent Act nor PTO regulations 
accord PTAB members alter ego status with respect to the Director.169 
Further, as noted above, the PTAB currently lacks the ability to make 
its decisions precedential without the Director’s approval.170 In short, 
the PTO has no relevant, separately derived authority on which the 
PTAB can be parasitic, and, in any event, the PTAB presents a 
weaker case than the BIA for parasitically derived authority. 
6. The Potentially Special Case of Precedential PTAB 
Interpretations.  Elsewhere in this issue, Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai 
suggest that a strong case for such deference might arise for a 
determination resulting from a PTO rehearing involving a PTAB 
panel stacked by the Director to ensure a particular result.171 But 
given Mead’s emphasis on “relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of [legal] force,”172 such irregular 
 
 166. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1) (1998)). The present 
analog of this regulation provides that BIA members are “to act as the Attorney General’s 
delegates in the cases that come before them.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). Such delegation has 
apparently been authorized by statute. GORDON ET AL., supra note 165, § 3.03[2] (“As 
contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Attorney General has 
delegated to various officers his responsibilities under the immigration laws.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (“The Attorney General shall establish such 
regulations, . . . delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney General 
determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”).  
 167. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). 
 168. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 169. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2012) (describing the PTAB); cf. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (reaffirming that the PTAB’s predecessor, the BPAI, “is not the alter 
ego or agent of” the head of the PTO); Duffy, supra note 33, at 908 (observing that BPAI 
members “are not mere ‘alter ego[s] or agent[s]’ of the PTO Director”).  
 170. See supra text accompanying note 152.  
 171. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent 
Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1595 (2016).  
 172. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
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proceedings and their extraordinary possibility seem a less than 
persuasive basis for Chevron deference. As noted earlier, although 
the Federal Circuit has previously found such proceedings to be 
authorized by the Patent Act, the Federal Circuit declined to address 
whether they violated the constitutional requirement of due 
process.173 
Ultimately, the best case for PTAB decisions warranting 
Chevron deference seems to lie with PTAB decisions designated as 
having precedential status. Some obstacles to Chevron deference for 
interpretations of substantive provisions of the Patent Act are 
overcome if one focuses solely on these decisions. Given that (1) 
precedential status means that the PTO views the relevant decision as 
binding and (2) the Director must approve such status, a precedential 
opinion seems more likely than a nonprecedential opinion to merit 
treatment as a true decision of “the agency” in APA terms.174 
Nonetheless, because there is no statutory basis for the PTAB’s 
procedure for designating opinions as precedential, a court might 
view as impermissible bootstrapping a proposition that a requirement 
for Director review developed by the PTO transforms an otherwise 
non-Chevron-deference meriting PTAB opinion into one that merits 
Chevron deference.175 
The Supreme Court’s reference to delegation by regulation in 
the course of according Chevron deference to the BIA provides little 
aid here because, with respect to the BIA, the question was 
essentially the distinct one of whether the Attorney General’s 
recognized interpretive authority flows down to the BIA.176 In the 
context of the PTAB, the challenge is to show that otherwise 
nonexistent interpretive authority arises from congressional provision 
 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 119; cf. Hickman, supra note 91, at 552 (observing 
that, “although the [Supreme] Court has made clear that decisions of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) carry the force of law and are Chevron-eligible,” a number of courts of appeals 
have held that “interpretations designated by the BIA as nonprecedential” do not merit 
Chevron deference and others “have reserved the question”).  
 175. Bressman, supra note 91, at 1469 (“Mead makes clear that agencies cannot shoehorn 
themselves into Chevron deference by voluntarily adopting procedures that Congress has not 
authorized.”); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
1004 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that, under Mead, “the existence of a formal 
rulemaking proceeding is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron 
deference,” with the lack of sufficiency resulting “because Congress may have intended not to 
leave the matter of a particular [statutory] interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the 
procedure the agency uses”). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 158–66.  
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for the PTAB and associated post-grant proceedings. The fact that 
the Supreme Court has accepted the ability of the Attorney General 
to delegate recognized Chevron-level authority to the BIA does not 
imply that the PTO can effectively generate Chevron-level 
interpretive authority by adopting one or more procedures involving 
both the PTAB and the Director. Without relevant congressional 
provision, the PTO’s generation of such procedure seems to offer 
little in the nature of evidence of a congressional intent to delegate 
Chevron-level interpretive authority. 
Moreover, even if the PTO’s current procedure for designating a 
PTAB opinion as precedential were a creature of Congress, it would 
arguably fall short under Mead because of how that procedure 
compares negatively to standard procedures for agency-level review 
in formal adjudication. Although a party to a PTAB adjudication may 
“request in writing that an opinion be made precedential,” the PTO 
does not appear to have issued rules in relation to such a request that 
provide for basics of agency-level review as contemplated by the 
APA177—namely, that parties have “a reasonable opportunity to 
submit for the [agency’s] consideration . . . (1) proposed findings and 
conclusions; or (2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended 
decisions of subordinate employees or to tentative agency decisions; 
and (3) supporting reasons for the exceptions or proposed findings or 
conclusions;”178 and that the agency generate a record “show[ing] the 
ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception presented.”179 Thus, 
the PTO’s current approach to according precedential status might 
fail Mead-informed expectations for a “procedure tending to foster 
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement” 
that presumptively binds Article III courts.180 
III.  PTO AS “PRIME MOVER” 
Part II argues that the PTO’s powers remain significantly limited, 
particularly with respect to its ability to bind courts to an agency 
interpretation of substantive provisions of the Patent Act. This Part 
contends that, despite such constraints, the PTO can still accomplish 
much through adjudicatory processes as patent law’s probable “prime 
mover”—the government body that is likely to be the first to address 
 
 177. USPTO SOP 2, supra note 151, at 2–3.  
 178. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2012). 
 179. Id. 
 180. United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).  
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many patent law issues in a centralized and systematic fashion. 
Further, although ostensibly back-end processes, the post-issuance 
proceedings administered by the PTAB indeed do much to enhance 
the PTO’s prime-mover potential. 
First, even without an entitlement to Chevron deference, PTAB 
decisions may be accorded persuasive weight. Indeed, although 
PTAB post-issuance proceedings are not formal adjudication in the 
manner explicitly contemplated by the APA, their relatively formal 
nature compared to earlier PTO proceedings suggests that, 
particularly when precedential, PTAB decisions in post-issuance 
proceedings are likely to have a greater claim to substantial Skidmore 
deference than was previously available to the PTO through 
adjudication. Although some have wondered about the substantiality 
of Skidmore deference,181 a relatively recent empirical study has led 
Kristin Hickman and Matthew Krueger to conclude that Skidmore 
review is in fact frequently “highly deferential,” with results 
“weighted heavily in favor of government agencies.”182 
Of course, as an alternative to applying Skidmore, courts might 
determine more simply that, quite generally, they owe no deference 
to PTAB rulings on questions of substantive patent law. In 2015, the 
Supreme Court apparently took such a tack in reviewing the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (IRS) views on the availability of certain tax 
credits under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.183 But 
the Court’s apparent failure to accord any deference in that case 
reflected special circumstances: the vast significance for national 
health insurance policy of the interpretive question184 and the Court’s 
belief that the IRS had “no expertise in crafting health insurance 
policy of this sort.”185 The PTO is unlikely to be deemed to have “no 
expertise” in substantive patent law, and PTAB rulings on questions 
of substantive patent law will, presumably, be perceived only rarely—
if ever—as having a policy significance on a par with a tax-credit 
 
 181. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 549 (“[S]ome have suggested that 
Skidmore deference itself is, in reality, a regime of zero deference . . . .”). 
 182. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2007). 
 183. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (discussing how “[t]he IRS addressed the 
availability of tax credits by promulgating a rule”). 
 184. Id. at 2489 (describing the availability of tax credits “on Federal Exchanges” as “a 
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’” that Congress “surely would have 
[delegated to the IRS] expressly” if it had intended such a delegation at all (quoting FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))). 
 185. Id.  
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question whose resolution threatened to hurl state insurance markets 
into “death spirals.”186 Thus, the Skidmore framework appears to offer 
a plausible mechanism for the PTO to use its new post-issuance 
proceedings to obtain meaningfully enhanced deference on questions 
of substantive patent law, particularly for those rulings designated as 
precedential.187 
A second way that PTAB proceedings can enable the PTO to 
flex its added muscle is by providing a forum for developing agency 
interpretations of PTO regulations. The Federal Circuit has recently 
emphasized the high level of deference that it gives PTAB 
interpretations of PTO regulations, saying that the court accepts such 
an interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with 
the regulation.”188 Given restrictions of the PTO’s ability to issue rules 
having the force of law, relevant regulations are likely to be 
substantially procedural, but the bounds and meaningfulness of 
distinctions between procedure and substance are not always clear. 
For example, the Federal Circuit applied the aforementioned high 
level of deference to uphold a PTAB interpretation that placed on a 
patent owner the burden of showing that new claims proposed in inter 
partes review “are patentable over the prior art of record.”189 By 
reversing the normal state of affairs in the PTO, under which claims 
are in essence presumed valid unless the PTO or another party 
provides reason to believe otherwise,190 the PTAB thereby effectively 
ratcheted up the bite of substantive patentability requirements.191 The 
 
 186. Id. at 2492–93 (eschewing a statutory interpretation that, in the Court’s view, would 
“likely create the very ‘death spirals’ [in state insurance markets] that Congress designed the 
[PPACA] to avoid”). 
 187. See United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (observing that “agencies 
charged with applying a statute necessarily make all sorts of interpretive choices, and while not 
all of those choices bind the judges to follow them, they certainly may influence courts facing 
questions the agencies have already answered”). But see Peter L. Strauss, In Search of 
Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792 (2014) (questioning the current Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the Skidmore deference framework in light of a case in which “there is not a 
mention of the concept—indeed, its relevance is effectively denied—in opinions signed by eight 
of the Justices”). 
 188. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re 
Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).  
 189. Id. at 1307. 
 190. See, e.g., Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In the prosecution of a 
patent, the initial burden falls on the PTO to set forth the basis for any rejection, i.e., a prima 
facie case.”). 
 191. Such substantive effect has caused the Supreme Court elsewhere to hold that the 
assignment of burdens of proof is substantive, rather than merely procedural. Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 849 (2014) (“[W]e have held that ‘the burden of 
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PTAB might more generally use its adjudicatory powers to interpret 
PTO regulations in ways that have a substantial impact on patent law 
practice and outcomes. Even more generally, the PTO possesses the 
ability to influence the course of patent law through its fundamental 
position as patent law’s “prime mover”—the first and, often, most 
readily accessed gatekeeper for whether a patent claim should be 
allowed or should continue in force. 
True, the sheer volume of patent applications and issued patents 
generates practical limitations on the influence that the PTO can 
exert through first-stage review. Even with several thousand 
examiners, the yearly influx of several hundred thousand applications 
means that the PTO can—and even arguably should192—often conduct 
little more than a relatively cursory investigation of various questions 
relating to patentability.193 Further, the need to use several thousand 
examiners, as well as hundreds of administrative patent judges, means 
that the PTO has natural problems ensuring that individual decisions 
by agency employees are properly representative of the official 
positions of the agency as a whole. 
Nonetheless, in part through the issuance of guidance documents 
that do not have the force of law, the PTO has already shown a 
capacity to influence the substantive course of patent law’s 
development. The utility guidelines that the PTO developed in the 
late 1990s to deal with a flood of patent applications for fragmentary 
DNA sequences194 were deployed by the PTO’s examination corps 
and the BPAI to reject specific patent claims in original 
examination.195 The Federal Circuit later affirmed these rejections 
 
proof’ is a ‘substantive aspect of a claim.’” (quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 
15, 20–21 (2000))).  
 192. Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
1495, 1497 (2001) (“Because so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much 
cheaper for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest 
additional resources examining patents that will never be heard from again.”). 
 193. See Golden, Proliferating Patents, supra note 61, at 496–97 (indicating how, roughly 
speaking, an average of something in the nature of twenty hours for PTO examiner work on 
each application follows from current numbers of patent examiners and incoming applications 
per year). 
 194. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 554 (discussing how “the USPTO 
injected new life into the utility requirement for biological-substance and chemical-substance 
inventions”). 
 195. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that, in reviewing a patent 
application, the PTO examiner had “found that claimed [DNA sequences] were not supported 
by a specific and substantial utility” and that the Board had also found that various asserted 
utilities for the sequences were not specific and substantial utilities).  
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under a deferential standard of review that reflected the factual 
underpinnings for the PTO’s approach.196 
Likewise, even before the AIA, the PTO has shown a capacity to 
use its adjudicatory processes to tee up important legal issues for 
courts and even to suggest novel ways in which the courts might 
ultimately resolve those issues. An example comes in the form of 
opinions associated with a 2005 precedential decision by the BPAI in 
Ex parte Lundgren.197 In that case, the Board addressed questions of 
subject-matter eligibility,198 previously a relatively dormant area of the 
law on patentability.199 More specifically, the opinion for the majority 
of the Board rejected a “technological arts” requirement for subject-
matter eligibility200 but declined to reject or criticize an alternative 
approach to limiting patentable subject matter suggested in a 
dissent.201 This dissent not only highlighted the PTO’s natural need to 
address such issues promptly202 but also proposed an alternative test 
for subject-matter eligibility under which a process claim must be 
“tied to a particular machine or apparatus” or “transform physical 
subject matter to a different state or thing.”203 The BPAI opinions’ 
suggestion of the possibility of reconsidering questions of patentable 
subject matter preceded the Supreme Court’s spur to that effect, 
 
 196. Id. at 1379 (“We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that 
each of the five claimed [DNA sequences] lacks[]a specific and substantial utility and that they 
are not enabled.”). 
 197. Ex parte Lundgren, No. 2003-2088, 2004 WL 3561262 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 20, 2004).  
 198. Id. at *4 (“We reverse the examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (non-statutory 
subject matter).”).  
 199. See Golden, Prime Percolator, supra note 12, at 683 (observing that “broad challenges 
to patentability to whole classes of subject matter” might, “[u]ntil recently,” have been classified 
as arguments “that parties appearing in patent cases [would] be systematically unlikely to 
make”). 
 200. Lundgren, 2004 WL 3561262, at *5 (“Our determination is that there is currently no 
judicially recognized separate ‘technological arts’ test to determine patent eligible subject 
matter under § 101.”).  
 201. Id. (“We decline at this stage . . . to enter a new ground of rejection based on Judge 
Barrett’s rationale, because in our view his proposed rejection would involve development of 
the factual record and, thus, we take no position in regard to the proposed new ground of 
rejection.”). 
 202. Id. at *12 (Barrett, Admin. Patent J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In 
recent years, the USPTO has been flooded with claims to ‘processes,’ many of which bear scant 
resemblance to classical processes of manipulating or transforming compositions of matter and 
of functions performed by machines.”).  
 203. Id. at *26 (“A series of steps which is not tied to a particular machine or apparatus, and 
which does not transform physical subject matter to a different state or thing, does not meet the 
statutory definition of a ‘process’ and is not patentable subject matter.”).  
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through a grant of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,204 and a later dissent from 
dismissal of that case as one in which certiorari was improvidently 
granted.205 The Federal Circuit later substantially adopted this 
“machine or transformation” test.206 Although the Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected the test as lacking sufficient statutory and 
precedential support207 as well as, in the opinion of at least four 
Justices, possessing excessive rigidity,208 the Supreme Court has left in 
place and bolstered the turn toward a more restrictive approach to 
subject-matter eligibility that the Boards’ judges had signaled was 
possible.209  
The PTO’s newly expanded power to engage in post-issuance 
proceedings increases its capacity to act as a “prime mover.” PTAB 
appeals and trials give private parties many opportunities to highlight 
issues that the PTO might address as a matter of first impression or, 
at least, before any presumptively conclusive, centralized 
determination by the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court. Provisions 
for automatic stays of district court litigation while a patent is subject 
to inter partes or post-grant review effectively provide the PTO with a 
variant of “primary jurisdiction”210 when a challenger to a patent files 
 
 204. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005) (granting 
certiorari). 
 205. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (per 
curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning Federal Circuit precedent on subject-matter 
eligibility); see also Golden, Prime Percolator, supra note 12, at 707 (“It seems no coincidence 
that, in the wake of Laboratory Corp., Federal Circuit panels experimented with more vigorous 
enforcement of requirements for subject matter eligibility . . . .”).  
 206. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 600 (2010) (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (noting the Federal Circuit’s adoption of a “machine-or-transformation 
test” for the patent eligibility of a process). 
 207. Id. at 602–04 (discussing statutory language, interpretive principles, and prior Supreme 
Court decisions). 
 208. Id. at 606 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“Section 101’s terms suggest that new technologies 
may call for new inquiries.”).  
 209. See id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (emphasizing that, in rejecting a machine-
or-transformation test lately adopted by the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court should not be 
“read as endorsing [prior] interpretations of § 101” by the Federal Circuit); id. at 658–59 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that rejection of the Federal Circuit’s prior 
“useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for subject-matter eligibility was “consistent with” all 
the Justices’ written opinions (quoting State St. Bank & Tr. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); see also id. at 614 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(stating that “it would be a grave mistake to assume that anything with a ‘useful, concrete and 
tangible result’ . . . may be patented” (quoting State St. Bank & Tr., 149 F.3d at 1373)).  
 210. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 34, at 221 (describing primary jurisdiction as “a concept 
used by courts to allocate initial decision making responsibility” and noting that, “[i]f a court 
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a civil action in district court after or on the same day as the 
challenger petitions for inter partes or post-grant review.211 
More generally, inter partes and post-grant review proceedings 
not only provide expanded opportunities for PTO action but also 
mean that such action will come in circumstances in which PTO 
review, in terms of timing and quality, is more on a par with the sort 
of trial-based, post-issuance review traditionally only available in 
Article III courts or, for at least a subset of infringement cases, the 
International Trade Commission.212 As opposed to prior provisions 
for ex parte reexamination and inter partes reexamination that limited 
grounds for post-issuance challenge to arguments of obviousness or 
lack of novelty based on prior-art “patents or printed publications,”213 
the new provisions for post-grant review broadly enable the PTO to 
review challenges to patent claims based on all the grounds for 
invalidity that an accused infringer might raise in litigation in the 
district courts.214 Moreover, these new provisions enable the PTO to 
 
concludes that an issue raised in an action before the court is within the primary jurisdiction of 
an agency, the court will defer any decision in the action before it until the agency has addressed 
the issue” (emphasis omitted)); John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process of Claim 
Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 109, 137 (2000) (observing 
that, after a court “decides to invoke the doctrine” of primary jurisdiction, the court may 
“grant[] a stay of proceedings”). 
 211. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012) (“If the petitioner or real party in interest files a civil action 
challenging the validity of a claim of the patent on or after the date on which the petitioner files 
a petition for inter partes review of the patent, that civil action shall be automatically stayed 
. . . .”); id. § 325(a)(2) (“If the petitioner or real party in interest files a civil action challenging 
the validity of a claim of the patent on or after the date on which the petitioner files a petition 
for post-grant review of the patent, that civil action shall be automatically stayed . . . .”). 
 212. Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing procedural aspects of post-grant review, inter 
partes review, and covered business method review proceedings); Melissa F. Wasserman, 
Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625, 
661 (2015); Wasserman, supra note 85, at 1981 (noting that the PTO must “allow oral arguments 
and discovery as part of [its] postgrant review proceedings”); cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 89, 
at 327–28 (2007) (observing that “various post-grant review proceedings . . . proposed [in the 
bills that ultimately culminated in amendment of the U.S. Patent Act] would be trial-type 
procedures on the record that bear the hallmarks of formal adjudication—most notably, a 
proceeding before an administrative judge at which the parties present evidence and cross-
examination, with the judge’s decision based on the record”). 
 213. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–03 (indicating allowed grounds from launching an ex parte 
reexamination); id. § 311(a) (pre-AIA provision applying to inter partes reexamination requests 
filed before September 16, 2012) (indicating allowed grounds for an inter partes reexamination). 
 214. See id. § 321(b) (“A petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as 
unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph 
(2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim).”); cf. AIA § 18(a) 
(providing for grounds for transitional covered business method patent review that largely track 
those for post-grant review).  
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institute post-grant review not only (1) on grounds that a challenge to 
one or more claims would “more likely than not” succeed,215 but also 
and alternatively (2) on grounds “that the petition [for post-grant 
review] raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to 
other patents or patent applications.”216 At the same time, the PTO 
retains the capacity to launch post-issuance proceedings sua sponte 
on the more limited grounds allowed for ex parte reexamination.217 
In sum, the PTO’s new post-issuance proceedings allow it to 
compete more substantially with Article III courts’ review of 
questions of patentability. They raise the possibility that court 
proceedings on such questions should be seen as more supplementary 
than complementary, thereby helping to call into question the need 
for as heavy-handed a judicial role as patent law has made traditional. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has noted how developments in patent law have 
strengthened the PTO’s hand while also appearing to leave its 
interpretive authority substantially constrained. In particular, Part II 
has argued that the PTO remains generally blocked from obtaining 
high-level Chevron deference for its interpretations of substantive 
provisions of the Patent Act, even when the PTO arrives at those 
interpretations through relatively formal PTAB proceedings. 
But as argued previously in an article that focused on 
rulemaking, rather than adjudication, concern with entitlement to 
Chevron deference can be overblown.218 Regardless of whether the 
PTO obtains Chevron-level deference for its interpretations of 
substantive provisions of the U.S. Patent Act, its general status as the 
first mover on questions of patentability and its expanded set of post-
issuance proceedings put the agency in prime position to have a 
significant impact on how patent law develops. Just as the PTO can 
influence the courts’ ultimately authoritative interpretations of the 
 
 215. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).  
 216. Id. § 324(b). 
 217. Id. § 303(a) (empowering the Director, “[o]n his own initiative, and any time . . . [to] 
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and 
publications”); id. § 304 (providing that a determination by the Director of “a substantial new 
question of patentability” in relation to patents and printed publications “will include an order 
for reexamination”). 
 218. Golden, USPTO’s Soft Power, supra note 7, at 558 (“The USPTO’s experience with 
utility and written-description guidelines shows that the USPTO can successfully use 
nonbinding rulemaking to provide a systematic response to certain patentability problems.”). 
GOLDEN IN PRINTER FINAL (UPDATED PAGE NUMBERS) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  3:38 PM 
2016] WORKING WITHOUT CHEVRON 1699 
law through persuasively supported interpretive rules,219 the agency 
can also influence those interpretations through persuasively 
supported PTAB opinions or through PTAB opinions that at the very 
least help to crystallize available adjudicatory options or otherwise 
catalyze deliberation in Article III courts. The BPAI judges’ opinions 
in Ex parte Lundgren illustrate how the PTO can help stir the 
adjudicatory pot in a way that encourages further legal 
developments.220 The extent to which the PTO exploits its strategic 
position wisely will likely play a significant role in the extent to which 
the U.S. patent system succeeds in its constitutional purpose to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”221 
 
 
 219. Id. at 553 (“There are already notable instances of situations in which the USPTO’s 
adoption of a policy, guideline, or practice on a controversial question of substantive patent law 
has ‘succeeded’ in the sense that courts . . . have upheld or embraced the USPTO’s position as a 
correct interpretation of statutory law.”). 
 220. See supra text accompanying notes 197–203. Given (1) the PTO’s presumably better 
factfinding capacities in its more trial-like post-issuance proceedings and (2) the Supreme 
Court’s recent highlighting of the Federal Circuit’s duty commonly to defer to other entities’ 
original factual findings, see Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) 
(“We hold that the appellate court must apply a ‘clear error,’ not a de novo, standard of review 
[to trial judge factfinding in relation to questions of patent claim construction].”), there is reason 
to hope that the PTO is well positioned to obtain substantial deference for even relatively 
general conclusions relating to the patentability of certain types of subject matter, as long as 
those opinions have a substantial grounding in factual findings. But cf. Benjamin & Rai, supra 
note 89, at 290 (contending that the Federal Circuit’s “[h]ighly aggressive application of [a 
substantial evidence] standard [of review] to the PTO’s informal proceedings—where the only 
formal evidence on which the PTO can rely to make the case against patentability is written 
prior art—yields the paradoxical result of rigorous review”). 
 221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
